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SELLMAN V STATE: ABSENT ADDITIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, CONSENT TO A VEHICLE SEARCH IN
A HIGH CRIME AREA DOES NOT CREATE REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY A TERRY FRISK OF A PASSENGER
WHO DISPLAYS NERVOUS BEHAVIOR; THEFT FROM A
VEHICLE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY INFER THAT AN
INDIVIDUAL IS ARMED.
By: Ashley N. Simmons
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, under the totality of the
circumstances, a law enforcement officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to conduct a Terry frisk of a passenger during a traffic stop. Sellman v. State,
449 Md. 526, 544, 144 A.3d 771, 782 (2016). The court ruled that a police
department policy authorizing officers to conduct Terry frisks based on
consent to search a vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 557, 144
A.3d at 790. The court further held that the crime of theft from vehicles does
not imply the possession of a deadly weapon. Id. at 562, 144 A.3d at 793.
On November 12, 2013, at approximately 2 a.m., Corporal William
Daughters ("Daughters") and Officer Dan Kramer ("Kramer") were on patrol
at an apartment complex. The location was considered a high crime area due
to prior thefts from vehicles, drug arrests, and illegal possession of handguns.
Daughters observed an individual, later identified as Donzel Sellman
("Sellman"), emerge from a dark area of an apartment building where there
was no entrance. Shortly after, Sellman got into the rear passenger seat of a
vehicle with three other occupants. The officers conducted surveillance and
eventually stopped the vehicle after noticing a broken taillight and tag light.
Daughters later testified that he observed Sellman sitting rigidly and looking
straight ahead to avoid eye contact. Daughters asked the driver if Sellman
lived in the apartment complex, to which she replied in the affirmative.
Sellman later gave a conflicting response, claiming that he did not.
Daughters issued a written warning to the driver and asked to search the
vehicle, to which the driver consented. Daughters asked all of the occupants
to identify themselves, and Sellman provided an alias. Daughters performed
a warrant check on the alias and date of birth, for which there was no record.
During this time, Daughters called for a third officer to see if any vehicles
had been broken into at the apartment complex. Pursuant to the Anne
Arundel County ("AACO") Police Department's policy allowing a limited
frisk of occupants before a vehicle search, Daughters conducted a Terry frisk
of Sellman in order to check for weapons. Sellman was arrested after
Daughters discovered a handgun in his waistband.
Sellman filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the
Terry frisk, which the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denied. At
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trial, Sellman pled not guilty subject to an agreed statement of facts to the
charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a
firearm during a drug trafficking crime. Sellman was sentenced to ten years
in prison, with the first five years served without the possibility of parole.
Sellman appealed the constitutionality of the Terry frisk to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed. In a split decision, the court
held that theft from vehicles implies weapon use. One judge dissented,
contending that the frisk was unconstitutional because officers as a matter of
routine conduct suspicionless searches of passengers in vehicles, which does
not meet the standard of reasonable suspicion.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari. Sellman, 449 Md.
at 538, 133 A.3d at 778. The issues before the court were (1) whether
Daughters had reasonable suspicion to believe Sellman was armed and
dangerous based on Sellman's display of nervousness in an area with prior
reports of theft from vehicles, and (2) whether a crime of theft from vehicles
implies use of a deadly weapon. Id. The court reviewed the matters de novo
based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. Id.
The court began its analysis by outlining the framework of a Terry frisk.
Sellman, 449 Md. at 541-42, 133 A.3d at 780. Generally, a search and
seizure violates the Fourth Amendment if it is not supported by probable
cause. Id. However, under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may conduct a brief
investigative stop of an individual if the officer has reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 541, 133 A.3d at 780 (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)). Furthermore, if the officer has reasonable suspicion
that the individual is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited
frisk of the individual to check for weapons. Sellman, 449 Md. at 541, 133
A.3d at 780 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The court noted that not every
Terry stop justifies a Terry frisk. Sellman, 449 Md. at 541, 133 A.3d at 780
(citing Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 319, 568 A.2d 22, 25-26 (1990)).
Next, the court discussed the standard for reasonable suspicion. Sellman,
449 Md. at 542, 133 A.3d at 781. In order to establish reasonable suspicion,
the officer must be able to identify specific and articulable facts that warrant
a limited frisk for weapons when viewed objectively based on the totality of
the circumstances. Id. at 542, 133 A.3d at 781 (citations omitted).
Subjective beliefs and mere hunches are insufficient. Sellman, 449 Md. at
541, 133 A.3d at 780.
Subsequently, the court used a fact-specific analysis of the present case
compared with previous case law to determine if Daughters had an objective
reasonable suspicion to justify frisking Sellman. Sellman, 449 Md. at 544,
133 A.3d at 782 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). According to the court,
Daughters failed to explain why, based on his training and experience,
Sellman's conduct led him to believe that Sellman was involved in the
previous vehicle break-ins and was therefore likely to be armed. Id. at 549,
133 A.3d at 785 (citing Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 511-12, 970 A.2d 894,
906-07 (2009)). In addition, Daughters did not observe any threatening
movements or gestures indicating Sellman was armed, or any instruments
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indicating association with theft. Sellman, 449 Md. at 550, 133 A.3d at 786-
87 (citing Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 368, 987 A.2d 72, 83 (2010)). The
court also noted that although Daughters called for back-up, the purpose was
to check for evidence of a car theft, not to alleviate safety concerns of being
outnumbered. Sellman, 449 Md. at 546, 133 A.4d at 784.
The court further held that Sellman's nervousness, without more, was
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Sellman,
449 Md. at 554-55, 133 A.3d at 788 (citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356,
387, 735 A.2d 491, 508 (1999)). Although seated rigidly in the vehicle,
Sellman did not show exaggerated immobility or appear to be concealing
anything in a piece of clothing large enough to hold a weapon. Sellman, 449
Md. at 556, 133 A.3d at 789 (distinguishing Russell v. State, 138 Md. App.
638, 653-54, 773 A.2d 564, 573 (2001)).
Next, the court discussed the lawfulness of the AACO police
department's policy authorizing officers to frisk occupants of a vehicle prior
to conducting a consent search. Sellman, 449 Md. at 557-59, 133 A.3d at
790-91. The court indicated that any search in the absence of reasonable
suspicion is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sellman, 449 Md. at 557,
133 A.3d at 790. Holding otherwise would allow officers to conduct frisks
after any lawful stops, which the court previously rejected. Id. (citing
Simpler, 318 Md. at 321-22, 568 A.3d at 27). As a result, the court
concluded that the police department policy was unlawful. Sellman, 449 Md.
at 557, 133 A.3d at 790.
Finally, the court addressed whether theft from vehicles implies the
possession of weapons, thereby providing reasonable suspicion that an
individual is armed. Sellman, 449 Md. at 559-62, 133 A.3d at 791-93. The
court concluded that absent other circumstances, theft from a vehicle does
not automatically place an officer in a dangerous situation. Id. at 561, 133
A.3d at 792. Thus, the court declined to create a bright line rule that theft of
property from a vehicle creates a presumption that he suspect is armed. Id.
at 562, 133 A.3d at 793.
Judge Watts dissented from the majority's findings, arguing that the facts
could establish a reasonable articulable suspicion by analyzing the totality of
the circumstances differently. Sellman, 449 Md. at 568, 133 A.3d at 796.
Judge Watts agreed that protecting citizens from unwarranted stop and frisks
is critical, but contended that the factors led to a clear potential danger to the
officers in the instant case. Id.
In Sellman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Daughters did not
have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk of Sellman. The court
also found that a policy allowing a search without reasonable suspicion is
unconstitutional. This ruling demonstrates the high burden officers must
overcome in order to show how the circumstances they observe prior to a
Terry frisk were indicative of criminal activity and danger. This case
illustrates the significance of officers and practitioners recognizing the fact-
specific nature of the circumstances in justifying a limited Terry frisk.
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